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nce again the European Council will meet 
in  an  emergency  session  at  the  end  of 
June,  with  the  eurozone  economy  in 
recession and actually plummeting in its Southern 
periphery. Further doubts are also growing on the 
sustainability of sovereign debts due to the vicious 
spiral  of  deteriorating  bank  balance  sheets, 
ballooning  potential  liabilities  from  banking 
rescues  and  widening  spreads  on  government 
borrowings.  The  sovereign  debt  crisis  in  the 
periphery  has  now  turned  into  a  fully  fledged 
banking  crisis  that  threatens  to  spread  from 
Greece  to  Spain  and  tomorrow,  who  knows,  to 
Italy, France and even Germany itself.  
Figure 1 provides a vivid picture of the situation: 
the constellation of spreads on ten-year sovereign 
debts over the Bund in the eurozone is wider than 
it  was  before  monetary  union,  as  if  financial 
markets  already  discounted  its  breakdown. 
Temporary respites, as notably in the early part of 
2012,  have  not interrupted  a trend  of  increasing 
divergence  that  is  already  undermining  the 
credibility  of  adjustment  efforts  under  way. 
Private  capital  flows  from  the  core  to  the 
periphery  have  dried  up  and  banking  and 
financial  markets  are  segmenting  along  national 
lines,  with  much  of  the  burden  of  financing 
payment imbalances and keeping credit channels 
open  increasingly  falling  on  the  ECB.  Not 
surprisingly,  this  does  not  reassure  savers  and 
investors,  who  increasingly  are  resorting  to 
emergency protective behaviour, liquidating their 
holdings  of  Southern  securities  and  hoarding 
liquidity,  sometimes  straight  currency  notes,  as 
the  confidence  crisis  in  the  banking  system 
spreads from one country to another. 
Figure 1. Eurozone bonds back to pre-euro levels (10-year 
government bonds interest rate, %)* 
 
* Monthly data.  
Source: ECB. 
Against this background, the public statements of 
the  leaders  and  heads  of  institutions  are  not 
helpful  since  they  suggest  a  climate  of 
brinkmanship  and  division  rather  than 
constructive engagement. On the one hand, many 
of  the  demands  directed  at  Germany,  the 
eurozone anchor, seem unrealistic, at least under 
present  institutional  arrangements.  Germany’s 
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reaction, under pressure from public opinion, is to 
stress  the  red  lines  that  cannot  be  trespassed 
rather than what could be usefully done. On the 
other  hand,  neither  can  high  debt-low  growth 
countries  be  expected  to  meet  their  adjustment 
obligations  regardless  of  the  economic 
environment  and  the  behaviour  of  creditor 
countries.  Nor  will  financial  markets  stabilise 
without a firmer commitment and stronger action 
by the ECB to halt sliding sovereign prices. Thus, 
here we are once again hoping that the European 
Council may be able to square the circle and come 
up with a policy package able to halt a seemingly 
inexorable slide towards total disaster – and the 
most  likely  outcome  of  another  patchwork  of 
soothing  announcements,  half-baked  measures 
and conflicting interpretations post factum. 
This Policy Brief discusses the main elements of a 
realistic and yet incisive policy package, capable 
of reassuring financial markets and a bewildered 
public opinion. It is more than Germany has been 
willing  to  accept  so  far  but  much  less  than  the 
many  demands  it  will  confront  at  the  Council 
meeting.  More  importantly,  it  only  requires  a 
minimum  of  additional  disbursements  by  the 
member  states,  while  strengthening  risk-sharing 
for sovereign and banking risks.  
1.  The need for a renewed growth initiative 
There is, first of all, a paramount need of a stern 
and  credible  announcement  that  stronger 
economic  growth  is  a  shared  goal  and  that  the 
European  Council  and  the  member  states  are 
ready to take measures to stem the fall in activity 
and  raise  aggregate  demand.  To  be  sure,  these 
measures  should  in  no  way  weaken  structural 
budgetary consolidation and market reforms, but 
exclusive emphasis on the supply side, as in the 
European  Council  March  statement,  simply  will 
not suffice.  
A  main  manifestation  of  declining  confidence  is 
activity  falling  more  rapidly  than  expected  in 
countries  undertaking  tough  adjustment 
programmes to restore sustainable budgetary and 
competitive  positions,  dragging  down  also  the 
‘core’ economies and pushing the entire eurozone 
into  recession  (see  Table  1,  particularly  the  last 
column  for  latest  estimates).  This  development 
has been partly due to an underestimation of the 
recessionary effects of budgetary austerity applied 
simultaneously  throughout  the  eurozone,  and 
partly  to  the  impact  of  the  spreading  banking 
crisis on the supply of credit.  
Table 1. GDP growth, 2012 (%) 
   European 
Commission  IMF  Latest 
France  0.5  0.5  -0.1 
Germany  0.7  0.6  -0.1 
Greece  -4.7  -4.7  -5.7 
Ireland  0.5  0.5  0.4 
Italy  -1.4  -1.9  -2.3 
Netherlands  -0.9  -0.5  -0.7 
Portugal  -3.3  -3.3  -3.5 
Spain  -1.8  -1.8  -2.2 
Euro area   -0.3  -0.3   -1.0 
UK  0.5  0.8  -0.2 
Source: European Commission 2012 Spring Forecast. IMF WEO 
April 2012 and author’s own estimates. 
 
In this regard, a comparison with the successful 
frontloaded  adjustment  stories  of  the  Baltic 
countries, notably Latvia, should not overlook the 
fact  that  those  countries  were  able  to  count  on 
expanding markets for their exports in Northern 
Europe, as well as an effective backstop for their 
banks by Sweden – both elements notably missing 
in the eurozone Southern periphery. Moreover, in 
Latvia,  domestic  demand  recovered  fairly  fast 
thanks to rapid productivity increases, but these 
were easier to achieve in a country with per capita 
GDP half that of the European Union.1  
True,  the  eurozone’s  weak  economies  have  yet 
quite  some  distance  to  go  with  their  ‘internal 
devaluations’  to  restore  viable  competitive 
positions – even if progress in Ireland and Greece 
on  this  front  has  been  substantial  (see  Figure  2, 
upper  quadrant).  Once  again,  however,  one 
should not forget that a substantial deterioration 
in  competitive  positions  vis-à-vis  Germany  was 
also  experienced  by  all  other  members  of  the 
eurozone,  including  Austria,  Belgium,  Finland, 
France  and  the  Netherlands  (Figure  2,  lower 
quadrant),  which  remains  as  a  source  of 
deflationary pressures throughout the eurozone. It 
is also reflected in persistently large imbalances in 
current  external  payments,  which  under  current 
polices  will  be  corrected  too  slowly  to  avoid  an 
unsustainable  accumulation  of  foreign  debt  (see 
                                                   
1 O. Blanchard, “Lessons from Latvia”, VoxEU, 15 June 
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Figure  3)  or,  if  financing  dries  up,  even  more 
deflation  in  deficit  countries.  Adjustment, 
moreover, has not been facilitated by the strength 
of the euro, in turn a result of a monetary policy 
stance  by  the  ECB  that  is  systematically  more 
cautious than that of the US Federal Reserve. 
Figure 2. Unit labour costs in PIIGS and core countries 
(1999=100) 
 
 
Source: European Commission, Ameco, 2012.  
Figure 3. Current account balance (% of GDP) 
Source: IMF WEO, April 2012  
In  sum,  unchanged  policies  hold  the  threat  of 
further deflation down the road. There is a need to 
accelerate structural reform but also investment to 
support  domestic  demand  in  the  eurozone,  and 
budgetary  retrenchment  should  not  be  pushed 
beyond  the  point  of  becoming  self-defeating. 
Much of what needs to be done is well identified 
by the recent Commission communication “Action 
for  Stability,  Growth  and  Jobs”.2  The  main 
recommendations  include  the  following  (my 
rephrasing and order of priority): 
i.  To  step  up  implementation  of  the  internal 
market  in  energy,  transport  and 
communications  (notably  broadband);3  I 
would add that the European Council should 
make  the  member  states’  obligations  in  this 
area  part  of  the  broad  economic  policy 
guidelines  procedure  of  Art.  121  of  TFEU, 
with  attendant  sanctions  for  failed 
implementation.    
ii.  To mobilise all available funds at Community 
level in support of infrastructure investment 
for  the  internal  market,  including  by 
immediately  starting  the  project  bond  pilot 
phase,4 and raising substantially – by at least 
€20 billion, which is double the Commission 
proposal – the paid-in capital of the EIB, thus 
greatly  enhancing  its  lending  capacity  for 
                                                   
2 COM(2012) 299 of 30.5.2012, final. 
3  An  influential  strand  of  thought  maintains  that 
infrastructure  investment  does  not  improve 
productivity,  mainly  based  on  the  US  experience  of 
strong growth with poor road and rail networks and 
dismal public utility services. The European variant has 
it that Europe already has all the infrastructure that it 
needs  and  that  further  investment  would  be  wasted. 
This  view  seems  unconvincing.  For  instance,  recent 
research  on  a  large  sample  of  countries  reported  in 
VoxEU (“Fiscal spending and growth: More patterns” 
by C. Carrière and J. de Melo, 17 May 2012) finds that a 
shift  in  discretionary  expenditures  towards  transport 
and  communications  “was  only  observed  for  fiscal 
events followed by growth events” (p. 2). In many an 
EU  country,  including  Italy  and  Germany,  over  the 
past  decade  public  investment  has  been  low, 
sometimes  below  what  was  needed  solely  for 
depreciation and maintenance. Moreover, the creation 
of a functioning market for gas and electricity and for 
digital  services  requires  large,  and  surely  profitable, 
investment  to  establish  the  connections  between 
segmented national markets – investment that was held 
back by national monopolists and that is a source not 
only of higher prices and lost productivity gains, but in 
the  case  of  gas  also  of  a  dangerous  concentration  of 
supply  with  a  politically  unreliable  partner  such  as 
Russia.   
4 As described in the Commission communication, “A 
pilot  for  the  Europe  2020  Project  Bond  Initiative”, 
COM(2011) 660 final of 19.10.2011.   
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worthy  Community  priorities.  Given  the 
excellent  record  of  EIB  lending,  the  money 
spent  through  this  channel  will  bring  good 
returns to its shareholders and does not entail 
higher  overall  indebtedness  by  the  member 
states.  
iii.  To  clarify  and  announce  that  budgetary 
deficits due to larger-than-expected drops in 
economic activity needn’t be offset by further 
restrictions,  as  permitted  by  the  revised 
Stability  and  Growth  Pact.  In  the  case  of 
Greece  and  Spain,  in  view  of  the  dismal 
output  and  employment  performance,  the 
Council should ease budgetary targets, which 
under  current  economic  circumstances  are 
simply unfeasible (more on this later in Table 
3). 
Regarding this last point, in order to preserve the 
confidence  of  investors,  a  number  of  eurozone 
countries must strike a difficult balance between 
budgetary  austerity  and  the  need  to  avoid  an 
economic overkill that would frustrate budgetary 
consolidation.5 This difficult balancing act would 
be facilitated by a clear statement by the European 
Council  whereby  letting  automatic  stabilisers 
work, while remaining on track with ‘structural’ 
budgetary targets, fully complies with EU policies 
and obligations. 
The prime minister of Italy, Mario Monti, has also 
proposed  to  exclude  certain  public  investments 
from  the  balanced  budget  rule.  The  proposal 
should not be too difficult to accept to the extent 
that the return on those investments is sufficient 
to  cover  interest  costs  and  the  repayment  of 
principal.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  an  element  of 
subsidy  is  required,  this  should  be  included  in 
current spending and the budgetary balance. 
In this context, a greater share of the adjustment 
burden  must  fall  on  Germany  through  ‘internal 
revaluation’  and  stronger  stimulus  to  domestic 
demand,  lest  the  correction  of  imbalances  adds 
further to the deflationary forces already present 
in  the  eurozone.6  Recent  fairly  generous  wage 
                                                   
5  C.  Cottarelli,  “The  austerity  debate:  Festina  lente!”, 
VoxEU, 20 April 2012. 
6  In  1999-2007,  Germany  engineered  a  significant 
‘internal’ devaluation that contributed to its economic 
recovery  and  the  build-up  of  its  external  surplus; 
subsequently,  there  has  been  little  change  in  relative 
competitive  positions  within  the  eurozone,  with  the 
sole exception of Greece and Ireland, as was recalled 
agreements  in  Germany  will  help  but  are  not 
enough; there is also a need to step up support of 
domestic demand. More aggressive liberalisation 
of the bloated banking system, network services, 
especially  in  energy  and  transport,  and  public 
procurement may provide over time a significant 
contribution  to  raising  domestic  investment  and 
incomes.  The  sizeable  investments  required  to 
make  up  for  the  loss  of  nuclear  energy  may 
contribute  more  immediate  stimulus.  All  this 
should not be seen as a concession but must be 
recognised as part of the obligations undertaken 
by  eurozone  governments  with  the  new 
procedure  for  excessive  imbalances,  although  so 
far  the  Commission  has  somewhat  shirked  its 
responsibility  to  apply  it  even-handedly.7 
Germany  should  be  convinced  that  without  its 
own  contribution  in  reviving  growth  and 
correcting  external  payment  imbalances,  the 
eurozone  will  not  escape  prolonged  depression 
and, in all likelihood, will be doomed.  
2.  Monetary policy 
The  growth  initiative  badly  needs  the  monetary 
support by the European Central Bank. Much in 
line with the tradition of the Bundesbank, the ECB 
has  tended  to  interpret  its  mandate  for  price 
stability  more  as  a  cap  on  inflation  –  no  higher 
than 2% – than a symmetric obligation to act also 
to  correct  inflation  shortfalls,  and  has  been 
reluctant  to  intervene  in  support  of  economic 
activity.8  Conversely,  in  the  United  States  and 
elsewhere,  monetary  authorities  have  turned  on 
the  money  spigot  much  more  aggressively  to 
break  the  fall  of  economic  activity  and  facilitate 
balance  sheet  deleveraging  by  households, 
                                                                                       
(see.  De  Grauwe,  “In  search  of  symmetry  in  the 
Eurozone”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 268, May 2012).     
7  Report  from  the  Commission,  “Alert  Mechanism 
Report. Report prepared in accordance with Articles 3 
and  4  of  the  Regulation  on  the  prevention  and 
correction of macro-economic imbalances”, COM(2012) 
68 final of 14.2.2012. 
8 Under Art. 127 of the TFEU, “The primary objective of 
the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without 
prejudice  to  the  objective  of  price  stability,  the ESCB 
shall  support  the  general  economic  policies  of  the 
Union  …”.  And  the  Governing  Council  of  the  ECB 
stated,  in  October  2008,  its  intention  “to  maintain 
inflation rates at levels below, but close to, 2% over the 
medium term”. Thus, the Treaty and the statutes of the 
ECB do not prevent it from acting more vigorously in 
support of economic activity, should the need arise.   AN AGENDA FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL | 5 
 
corporations  and  the  financial  system.  As  a 
consequence,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  2007-09 
financial  crisis,  the  euro  has  remained  strong, 
probably too strong, vis-à-vis the dollar and the 
other main currencies (including the UK pound), 
adding further to deflationary forces and ‘boxing’ 
within  the  eurozone  the  external  payment 
imbalances.  As  of  late,  the  euro-dollar  exchange 
rate has weakened to around 1.25, more as result 
of  market  concerns  about  the  future  of  the 
currency  than  the  monetary  stance;  a  further 
weakening  into  the  1.10  region  would  be  very 
welcome  news  for  eurozone  exporters  and 
economic activity. 
Meanwhile, inflation in the eurozone is receding 
to  the  2%  target  and  is  widely  expected  to  fall 
below it around year end. In view of the dire state 
of  economic  activity  and  the  long  time-lags 
between monetary stimulus and economic effects, 
it is high time for the ECB to lower their policy 
rates to zero. Moreover, not only do the ongoing 
liquidity shock hitting the eurozone and the need 
for  the  banking  system  to  proceed  with 
deleveraging9  fully  justify  a  continuation  of  the 
unlimited  provision  of  liquidity,  including  the 
LTROs, but serious consideration should be given 
to quantitative easing through purchases of long-
term sovereigns. This latter action should also aim 
to cap interest rate spreads as a bridge to calmer 
financial  market  conditions,  providing  markets 
with a temporary anchor until they will recognise 
the progress under way in budgetary stabilisation 
and structural reform. 
If stabilisation of financial markets succeeds, the 
ECB is likely to earn hefty profits; however, the 
ECB should continue to enjoy a full, albeit perhaps 
not  explicit,  guarantee  that  any  losses  on  its 
sovereign  portfolio  deriving  from  restructuring 
operations would be borne by the member states 
though  the  EFSF  and,  soon,  the  ESM  –  as 
happened with the Greek sovereign restructuring.  
Monetary policy matters are not for the European 
Council  to  decide;  they  could,  however,  be 
discussed with the ECB President Mario Draghi. 
The ECB would no doubt feel freer to act, were it 
less  subject  to  political  pressure  to  exercise 
restraint from its German and Northern European 
members.     
                                                   
9  C.  Puhr,  S.  W.  Schmitz,  R.  Spitzer  and  H.  Hesse, 
“Room  for  maneuver:  the  deleveraging  story  of 
Eurozone banks since 2008”, VoxEU, 14 June 2012.  
3.  Bank restructuring and banking union 
In  the  beginning,  it  was  a  small-country  debt 
crisis, gradually transformed by contagion into a 
eurozone  sovereign  debt  crisis  threatening  to 
topple  Spain  and  Italy.  Later  on,  it  has  evolved 
into  a  banking  crisis  that,  unless  it  is  stopped, 
could soon spread to all banking markets in the 
European  Union  and  break  the  euro,  with 
devastating economic dislocations. 
The  immediate  cause,  as  cross-border  interbank 
flows between creditor and debtor countries have 
shrunk  to  a  trickle,  has  been  the  growing 
concentration  of  sovereign  debt  with  national 
banks  in  crisis  countries  –  facilitated  by  carry 
trade operations that banks undertook in a large-
scale  with  ECB  LTRO  funds  to  repair  their 
damaged balance sheets.10 As a consequence, most 
private  holdings  of  Greek  public  debt  are  now 
concentrated  with  Greek  banks,  and  more  than 
half  of  public  debt  in  Spain  is  held  by  Spanish 
banks.  
The vicious spiral between the sovereign debt and 
banking  crises  has  been  compounded  by  the 
decision,  first  taken  in  Europe  by  Ireland,  and 
later  followed  in  Spain’s  Bankia  crisis,  to  make 
good  all  banks’  private  creditors  and  shift  the 
burden of rescues onto the public budget.  Fears of 
a  repeat  of  the  post-Lehman  disaster  have  been 
one reason; another has been pressure by creditor 
countries to spare their banks from any losses on 
their exposure. Thus, as the sovereign debt crisis 
has deepened, banks’ ratings are lowered; as the 
banks face the prospect of growing losses on their 
government  securities,  financial  markets  raise 
estimates of potential losses and attendant capital 
injections,  which  are  immediately  computed  as 
larger government debt. 
The  Eurogroup  statement  on  Spain’s  request  for 
financial  assistance  for  its  banks  of  June  9th  has 
made  this  dangerous  interconnection  an  official 
policy:  “The  Eurogroup  considers  that  the Fund 
for Orderly Bank restructuring (FROB), acting as 
an agent of the Spanish government, could receive 
the  funds  and  channel  them  to  the  financial 
institutions  concerned.  The  Spanish  government 
will retain the full responsibility of the financial 
assistance and will sign the MoU.” 
A  better  alternative,  rightly  advocated  by  the 
French government, would have been to use the 
                                                   
10  D.  Wessels,  “Risks  Rise  as  Europe’s  banking  Ties 
Fray”, Wall Street Journal, 14 June 2012.  6 | STEFANO MICOSSI 
 
EFSF residual funds – which are in excess of €200 
billion (see Table 2) – directly to inject capital into 
Bankia and, if need be, into other Spanish banks 
running into trouble.  
Table 2. EFSF assistance programme, as of May 2012 
(€ billion) 
Country  Agreed 
amount 
Disbursed  Period 
covered  
by the 
assistance 
Other 
partners 
Ireland  17.7  12  2010-13  IMF, 
EFSM 
and 
bilateral 
loans by 
the UK, 
DK & 
SWE 
Portugal  26  9.6  2011-14  IMF and 
EFSM 
 
Greece 
II 
179.7  103.7  2011-15  IMF 
 
Remainder for utilisation: €216.7 billion 
Source:  A.  Casale  et  al.,  “The  implications  for  the  EU  and 
national  budgets  of  the  use  of  EU  instruments  for  macro-
financial  stability  2012”,  paper  requested  by  the  European 
Parliament's Committee on Budgets, forthcoming. 
 
This  would  have  effectively  severed  the 
pernicious  spiral  between  the  government  and 
banking  solvency  crises,  with  immediate 
beneficial effects on confidence. A non-negligible 
benefit  of  using  the  EFSF  would  be  to  avoid 
creating a new class of super-senior claims on the 
Spanish  Treasury,  which  would  inevitably 
accelerate the flight to safety of junior creditors.   
This  approach  requires  two  further  conditions. 
The first is that conditionality imposed on banks 
requiring help be negotiated directly by the EFSF, 
with the assistance of the ECB. The ECB should be 
given  full  supervisory  powers  to  ascertain  their 
true  conditions,  verify  compliance  with  agreed 
restructuring  measures  and,  in  case  of  non-
compliance, resolve the bank. These powers could 
be entrusted to the ECB by the European Council 
under  Art.  127.6  of  TFEU;  it  would  set  a  useful 
precedent  for  a  gradual  extension  of  similar 
powers  over  all  cross-border  banks  with  a  legal 
seat in the European Union.    
The second condition is that the shareholders and 
creditors of banks seeking assistance should take 
their share of emerging losses. To this end, first, 
rather  than  debentures,  the  EFSF should  receive 
(non-voting)  preferred  shares  of  the  bank  under 
rescue, at minimal cost (the EFSF borrowing cost 
plus a fee), redeemable within three years. Should 
the bank fail to redeem them, they would become 
full voting shares and the EFSF would take over 
the  bank.  This  approach  has  the  advantage  of 
giving shareholders a chance to restore the bank 
to health and avoiding immediate nationalisation 
– as in the US post-Lehman experience. Moreover, 
as suggested  by  the  Juan  de Mariana  Institute,11 
subordinated  and  senior  unsecured  creditors  of 
the  banks should  be  called  to  a  forced  debt-for-
equity conversion; rather than to reduce the size 
of  the  initial  capital  injection  by  the  EFSF,  this 
could help strengthen the bank’s capital position 
later  on  and  facilitate  the  redemption  of  the 
preferred shares.  
The Institute has calculated that there are in the 
Spanish  banking  system  about  €88  billion  of 
subordinated liabilities and another €160 billion of 
senior  unsecured  debt.  With  conversion  rates  of 
100% for the former and 40% of the latter, there 
would be some €150 billion available – up to €175 
billion  if  expected  profits  were  added  in  –  to 
recapitalise  the  Spanish  banking  system,  thus 
covering  even  the  highest  estimates  of  potential 
losses without increasing the burden on Spanish 
taxpayers. Since depositors would be unaffected – 
the private interbank market is already closed to 
Spanish banks and conversions would take place 
as part of well structured bank rescue operations – 
the  impact  of  forced  conversions  on  financial 
markets would in all likelihood be manageable.  
In sum, the European Council should change the 
tack imprudently taken by the Eurogroup and put 
efficiency  above  expediency  in  managing  the 
Spanish  banking  crisis.  The  same  applies  to 
Greece, where the EFSF/ESM should step in, wipe 
out existing shareholders and assume full control 
of the banking system.12  
The agenda of the European Council is likely to 
include the broader theme of the banking union. 
In  this  regard,  as  argued  in  a  recent  CEPS 
                                                   
11 J.R. Rallo, “A Better Way to Save Spain’s Banks”, Wall 
Street Journal, 15-17 June 2012.  
12 D. Gros and D. Schoenmaker, “Cleaning up the mess: 
Bank  resolution  in  a  systemic  crisis”,  CEPS 
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Commentary and VoxEU column,13 it is important 
to distinguish what is needed to stop a ‘systemic’ 
confidence  crisis  hitting  the  banking  system  in 
certain  countries  –  as  I  have  discussed  above  – 
from  the  arrangements  required  at  EU  level  to 
build a stable banking and financial system while 
preserving  the  internal  market.  For  sure, 
extending  a  ‘blanket’  deposit  insurance  to  all 
cross-border  banks  would  not  be  easy  to  agree 
and would not work to restore confidence, given 
that  it  would  entail  new  substantial  liabilities 
falling  on  governments. It  would  also  aggravate 
moral hazard.14 
As  to  the  banking  union  itself,  the  European 
Council  cannot  be  expected  to  come  up  with  a 
complete blueprint, but it should at least set clear 
goals and deadlines, as it managed to do twice in 
the last decade with the Financial Services Action 
Plan  and  the  reform  of  the  EU  supervisory 
structure.  The  ingredients  are  known  and  must 
encompass centralisation of supervision (probably 
with the ECB, in view of its stronger credibility), 
the  creation  of  an  EU-wide  deposit  insurance 
scheme  for  cross-border  banks,  with  attendant 
insurance  fund  (building  on  existing  national 
arrangements, rather than substituting them with 
a brand new scheme), and a supranational crisis 
management  and  resolution  procedure.15  A 
central requirement is a new system of mandated 
supervisory  action,  closely  linked  to  the  new 
deposit insurance, whereby supervisors would be 
obliged to act – or at least be bound by a strong 
presumption to act – when bank capital weakens 
below certain thresholds. This is the only way to 
end  supervisory  forbearance  and  overcome  the 
tendency for national supervisors to gang up with 
their  regulated  entities,  to  the  detriment  of 
depositors and taxpayers, but also eventually the 
internal market.16 
                                                   
13  J.  Carmassi,  C.  Di  Noia  and  S.  Micossi,  “Banking 
Union  in  the  Eurozone  and  the  European  Union”, 
CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012.  
14 International Association of Deposit Insurers (2012), 
“Transition  from  a  blanket  guaranty  or  extended 
coverage  to  a  limited  coverage  system”,  Discussion 
Paper, Basel, February.  
15  See  K.  Lannoo,  “Banking  Union  in  Three  Steps”, 
CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012.  
16 J. Carmassi, E. Luchetti and S. Micossi, Overcoming 
Too-Big-To-Fail  –  A  regulatory  framework  to  limit  moral 
hazard  and  free  riding  in  the  financial  sector,  CEPS 
Paperback, March 2010. 
4.  Managing the debt overhang 
Following  the  2007-09  crisis,  a  rapid  and  large 
increase  of  government  debt  has  been  a 
generalised  phenomenon  in  the  industrially 
advanced  world:  for  the  first  time,  the  average 
debt-to-GDP  ratio  for  OECD  countries  has 
surpassed 100%; it is over 200% per cent in Japan 
and  120%  in  Italy,  but  many  other  countries, 
including the United States, have surpassed 100% 
and  several  yet  are  passing  the  90%  mark. 
Budgetary  consolidation  will  weigh  on  growth 
prospects  for  two  generations  to  come,  and  the 
welfare state as we have known it in Europe since 
World War II will have to be transformed, also in 
view of the rapidly aging population.17 
While  this  situation  is  common  to  much  of  the 
advanced  world,  the  eurozone  debt  crisis  has 
features that set it apart: while the average debt-
to-GDP  ratio  is  no  higher  than  that  in  other 
advanced  countries,  and  consolidation  efforts 
have  started  earlier  resulting  in  a  much  lower 
deficit-to-GDP  ratio  (Figure  4),  in  the  past  two 
years  the  eurozone  has  been  mired  in  a  severe 
crisis of confidence.  
Figure 4. General government debt and deficit, 2011 and 
2016 (% of GDP) 
  
Source: IMF WEO, April 2012.  
                                                   
17  D.  Sutherland,  P.  Hoeller  and  R.  Merola  (2012), 
“Fiscal  consolidation:  how  much,  How  fast  and  by 
what means?”, OECD Economic Policy Papers, April. 
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As  demonstrated  by  Professor  De  Grauwe,  this 
points to a systemic dimension of the crisis that 
cannot  be  reduced  to  profligate  behaviour  by 
budgetary  sinners  but  also  has  roots  in  flawed 
institutions of the monetary union itself.18 
In  synthesis,  three  main  flaws  have  been  made 
evident by developments since the Greek financial 
crisis started: 
(i)  The  system  lacked  effective  safeguards 
against  divergent  budgetary  policies.  The 
Stability and Growth Pact could have offered 
a  shield  but  it  was  fatally  weakened  when 
France  and  Germany  suspended  its 
application for themselves, in November 2003; 
at  all  events,  as  long  as  enforcement  of 
budgetary  discipline  is  entrusted  to  an 
intergovernmental  body,  the  problem  is 
bound to reappear, limiting the credibility of 
common budgetary rules.  
(ii)  From the start until the aftermath of the post-
Lehman  financial  crisis,  the  single  monetary 
policy entailed low real interest rates in high-
inflation countries and high real interest rates 
in  low-inflation  countries,  encouraging 
excessive  government  deficits  and  credit 
growth  to  the  private  sector  in  the  former 
countries  and  depressing  investment  in  the 
latter,  and  financing  economic  divergences. 
As  a  result,  ‘core’  countries’  banks 
accumulated  excessive  claims  on  divergent 
countries in the periphery. 
(iii) Once the crisis hit, leading to a re-pricing of 
risks  in  financial  markets,  the  disconnection 
between  monetary  (centralised)  and  fiscal 
(decentralised) powers has created a vacuum 
de  facto  impeding  full  use  of  monetary 
instruments  to  meet  monetary  and  financial 
shocks,  and  leaving  individual  members  of 
the  eurozone  exposed  to  brutal  pressure  by 
financial markets.  
Over the past two years, fundamental changes in 
the  economic  governance  have  tried  to  rectify 
these  flaws,  alas  so  far  without  succeeding.  An 
excessive burden for keeping the system afloat has 
fallen  onto  the  ECB;  disagreements  on  the 
interpretation  of  the  crisis  and  its  cures  have 
opened  a  gulf  of  mistrust  and  recrimination 
between its members. 
                                                   
18  P.  De  Grauwe,  “The  Governance  of  a  Fragile 
Eurozone”,  CEPS  Working  Document  No.  346,  May 
2011.  
By  now  it  is  clear  that  there  will  be  no  lasting 
remedy to the crisis of confidence, unless all three 
problems are dealt with simultaneously. History 
indicates that a fully functioning monetary union 
requires a mutualisation of government debts and 
centralised taxation powers to back up the central 
bank in case of large financial shocks; an effective 
balance  budget  obligation  and  no-bail-out  rule 
constraining  ‘sub-federal’  levels  of  government; 
and  a  central  bank  free  to  act  as  required  to 
confront liquidity and confidence shocks.19 All this 
is not in the cards today and can only be achieved 
within the context of a full federal union, as Ms. 
Merkel  is  right  to  point  out  (and  Mr.  Hollande 
would be wise to heed, with full understanding of 
the implied surrender of sovereignty). 
The  question  determining  whether  the  eurozone 
will survive is whether, while setting explicitly for 
itself the ultimate goal of federal union – which so 
far has not happened – the European Council can 
put  together  intermediate  arrangements  capable 
of halting the crisis and restoring trust among its 
members, as a bridge towards the ultimate goal. 
Of  course,  when push  comes  to shove,  the  ECB 
has  little  choice  but  to  intervene  as  required  to 
stop contagion and the melting down of sovereign 
and banking markets. It should be stressed that its 
statutes  pose  no  limitation  to  its  market 
interventions,  with  the  sole  proviso  that  they 
should not endanger price stability – which is not 
likely with the present dramatically high demand 
for  liquidity.  However,  its  task  would  be 
haphazard and exposed to enormous risks, were it 
not able to count on solid agreement between the 
member states on how to deal with the excessive 
build-up of sovereign debts. 
Thus,  the  second  building  block  of  effective 
transitional arrangements that is coming together 
is  made  up  by  the  new  economic  governance 
arrangements and the Fiscal Compact. Ratification 
and full bona-fide implementation of the latter is 
an  essential  component  for  rebuilding  mutual 
trust within the eurozone, and therefore should be 
pursued  as  a  matter  of  the  highest  priority  and 
urgency. 
The third, and final building block is some kind of 
mutualisation of sovereign debts. This is necessary 
                                                   
19 M.D. Bordo, A. Markiewicz and L. Jonung, “A fiscal 
union for the euro: Some lessons from history”, NBER 
WP No. 17380, September 2011.   
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for  two  reasons.  The  first  reason  is  economic 
sustainability  of  adjustment:  there  is  an  urgent 
need  to  lower  the  spreads  that  the  eurozone 
periphery  must  pay  on  its  outstanding  public 
debt,  which  risks  frustrating  ongoing  efforts  at 
budgetary  consolidation  and  indeed  pushing 
indebted countries beyond the point of dynamic 
instability.  It  should  not  be  overlooked,  in  this 
regard,  that  –  should  Spain  or  Italy  lose  market 
access – the attendant costs for Germany would 
climb steeply both if it decided to rescue them or 
if the euro was let go and the eurozone broke up.  
The  second  reason  requiring  some  debt 
mutualisation  is  political  sustainability:  political 
support  for  painful  and  protracted  adjustment 
programmes  cannot  survive  without  stronger 
signs that sacrifices will bear fruits – which cannot 
happen unless the sovereign risks are somewhat 
shared. Please  note  that  I  am  talking  of  sharing 
risks, not directly the debt burdens. 
A cursory look at Figure 5 confirms that the issue 
of  economic  and  political  sustainability  is  a 
serious  one.  According  to  IMF  estimates,  under 
current growth and interest rate scenarios, by 2016 
the debt-to-GDP ratios of most eurozone countries 
will  basically  not  diminish  or  only  do  so 
marginally,  and  as  a  result  the  average  debt-to-
GDP ratio for the eurozone will actually increase. 
The main exception is Germany, where the ratio 
will decline below 80% – but nonetheless remain 
well above 60%. Some decline is also observed for 
Greece,  but  this  is  of  course  the  result  of  debt 
restructuring.  
This  is  the  most  difficult  issue  since  German 
taxpayers  must  be  convinced  that  they  are  not 
asked to make good the debts incurred by others. 
The good news is that a proposal that meets this 
requirement exists, namely the proposal for a debt 
redemption fund put forth by the German Council 
of Economic Experts.20 The idea is fairly simple: all 
sovereign debt in excess of the 60% debt-to-GDP 
ratio of eurozone member states, excluding those 
already  under  financial  assistance,  would  be 
                                                   
20 German Council of Economic Experts, “Euro Area in 
crisis”,  Annual  Report  2011/12,  Third  Chapter, 
Wiesbaden, November 2011. See also P. Bofinger, L.P. 
Feld, W. Franz, C.M. Schmidt and B. Weder di Mauro, 
“A European Redemption Pact”, VoxEU, 9 November 
2011; and H. Doluca, A. Hϋbner, D. Rumpf, B. Weigert, 
“The  European  redemption  Pact:  An  Illustrative 
Guide”,  German  Council  of  Economic  Experts, 
Working Paper 02/2012, February 2012.   
placed in a redemption fund (over a transitional 
‘roll in’ period of 3-4 years), in exchange for jointly 
guaranteed 25-year debentures issued by the fund 
in  financial  markets,  with  an  immediate 
substantial  interest  rate  relief  for  more  indebted 
countries.  Each  country  participating  in  the 
scheme  would  continue  to service  its  own  debt, 
pro-quota,  until  full  redemption.  To  this  end,  it 
would  have  to  segregate  for  the  redemption 
payments  a  specific  revenue  source  from  its 
national  budget,  under  appropriate  irrevocable 
arrangements. After 25 years, all the debt would 
be paid out and all countries would have debt-to-
GDP ratio at or below the 60% target. 
Figure 5. Public debt in selected countries, 2011 and 2016 
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF WEO, April 2012.  
Table  3  throws  some  further  light  on  the  issue. 
The  left-hand  columns  report  current  and 
structural  primary  balances  –  i.e.  total 
expenditures  minus  revenues  and  interest 
payments – in 2011 of selected eurozone members, 
and  in  the  centre  column  the  primary  balances 
implicit  in  budgetary  targets  agreed  by  each 
country under the excessive deficit procedure or 
broad policy guidelines (3rd column from the left). 
The  table  also  report  the  longer-term  estimates 
prepared  by  the  OECD  of  primary  balances 
required to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio to 50% by 
2050 (4th column). The latter estimate is interesting 
since it incorporates long-term pressures deriving 
from pensions, health and long-term care. As may 
be  seen,  on  this  score,  Italy  looks  better  than 
France,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  mainly 
thanks to its pension reform.  
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Table 3. Budgetary consolidation requirements (% of GDP) 
 
*  Source:  European  Commission,  “Assessment  of  the  2012 
national  reform  programme  and  stability  programme”  for 
Member  States,  30  May  2012.  For  Greece,  European 
Commission, “The Second Economic Adjustment Programme 
for Greece”, March 2012.  
**  Increase  in  the  underlying  primary  balance  needed  to 
bring gross financial liabilities to 50% of GDP in 2050. Source: 
OECD,  "Fiscal  Consolidation:  how  much, how fast and by 
what  means",  OECD  Economic  Policy  Paper  No.  1/2012, 
April.  
***  Source:  German  Council  of  Economic  Experts,  “The 
European Redemption Pact: An Illustrative Guide”, Working 
Paper No. 2, 2012. 
The table highlights that indeed strenuous efforts 
will  be  required  over  decades  to  maintain 
acceptable  budgetary  balances.  The  last  column 
reports  the  primary  balances  that  would  be 
required,  under  appropriate  assumptions  on 
interest  rates,  under  the  European  Redemption 
Pact (ERP) of the German Economic Experts: the 
savings are substantial, and may indeed make the 
whole difference between (economic and political) 
sustainability  and  un-sustainability.  The  Table 
confirms that the effort required of Greece, Spain 
and  Ireland  may  not  be  realistically  achievable, 
pointing  to  the  need  of  relaxing  existing 
commitments.  
Under the ERP, Germany would shoulder some of 
the risks of sovereign debt in the periphery – and 
pay an interest premium for this – but would be 
fairly  secure  that  it  will  not  have  to  repay  debt 
incurred by others. The redemption fund would 
be a temporary device. Capital markets would in 
all  likelihood  very  much  like  the  debentures 
issued  by  the  fund,  leading  to  the  creation  of  a 
liquid and deep market for eurozone paper. Over 
time, with progress towards federal union, these 
securities  could  be  substituted  by  jointly  issued 
Union bonds of the federation – without any need 
for  anyone  to  take  over  the  accumulated 
obligations of others. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions     
As all too often in the recent past, the European 
Council  meets  in  a  make-or-break  environment, 
with Greece barely back to the operating table and 
Spain  and  Italy  still  under  heavy  pressure  in 
financial  markets.  These  pressures  will  not  go 
away  until  the  heads  of  state  and  government 
show some solid consensus on policy framework 
capable  of  reconciling  austerity  with  growth, 
dealing with the debt overhang, and ensuring that 
the  ECB  can  provide  adequate  liquidity  support 
without  endangering  its  balance  sheet  and 
independence.   
This  note  has  outlined  the  main  ingredients  of 
such  a  package  that  is  not  impossible  for  the 
eurozone members to consider and yet holds good 
promise  to  go  a  long  way  towards  restoring 
confidence  and  normal  conditions  in  financial 
markets.  
actual  structural to meet agreed  
budgetary target
(change 2011-
to stabilize the 
current debt ratio
by 2050 (OECD**) 
under the 
ERP*** 
Germany 16 1,8 0,9 4,8 2,0
France -2,6 -1,6 4,3 5,4 2,4
Italy 1,0 1,3 4,7 2,6 4,2
Spain -6,1 -4,9 8,1 4,2 2,5
Netherlands -2,6 -1,4 1,6 6,3 1,5
Belgium -0,4 -0,1 3,8 6,0 2,9
Ireland -9,7 -4,9 12,5 8,6 -
Portugal -0,4 -6,2 4,1 3,0 -
Greece -2,4 - 6,9 3,3 -
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